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Reading the Recent Monetary History 
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Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Pablo Guerrón-Quintana, and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez
In this paper the authors report the results of the estimation of a rich dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model of the U.S. economy with both stochastic volatility and parameter drifting
in the Taylor rule. They use the results of this estimation to examine the recent monetary history
of the United States and to interpret, through this lens, the sources of the rise and fall of the Great
Inflation from the late 1960s to the early 1980s and of the Great Moderation of business cycle fluc-
tuations between 1984 and 2007. Their main findings are that, while there is strong evidence of
changes in monetary policy during Chairman Paul Volcker’s tenure at the Federal Reserve, those
changes contributed little to the Great Moderation. Instead, changes in the volatility of structural
shocks account for most of it. Also, although the authors find that monetary policy was different
under Volcker, they do not find much evidence of a big difference in monetary policy among the
tenures of Chairmen Arthur Burns, G. William Miller, and Alan Greenspan. The difference in aggre-
gate outcomes across these periods is attributed to the time-varying volatility of shocks. The his-
tory for inflation is more nuanced, as a more vigorous stand against it would have reduced inflation
in the 1970s, but not completely eliminated it. In addition, they find that volatile shocks (espe-
cially those related to aggregate demand) were important contributors to the Great Inflation. 
(JEL E10, E30, C11)
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process. First and foremost, documents are not a
perfect photograph of reality. For example, partici-
pants at Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meetings do not necessarily say or vote what they
really would like to say or vote, but what they
think is appropriate at the moment given their
objectives and their assessment of the strategic
interactions among the members of the committee.
(The literature on cheap talk and strategic voting
is precisely based on those insights.) Also, mem-
oirs are often incomplete or faulty and staff memos
are the product of negotiations and compromises
among several actors. Second, even the most com-
1. INTRODUCTION
U
ncovering the rationales behind monetary
policy is hard. While the instruments of
policy, such as the federal funds rate or
reserve requirements, are directly observable, the
process that led to their choice is not. Instead,
we have the documentary record of the minutes
of different meetings, the memoirs of participants
in the process, and the internal memos circulated
within the Federal Reserve System.
Although this paper trail is valuable, it is not
and cannot be a complete record of the policy
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full richness of a policy decision process in a
modern society. Even if it could, it would proba-
bly be impossible for any economist or historian
to digest the whole archival record.1 Third, even
if we could forget for a minute about the limita-
tions of the documents, we would face the fact
that actual decisions tell us only about what was
done, but say little about what would have been
done in other circumstances. And while the
absence of an explicit counterfactual may be a
minor problem for historians, it is a deep flaw
for economists who are interested in evaluating
policy rules and making recommendations regard-
ing the response to future events that may be very
different from past experiences.
Therefore, in this paper we investigate the
history of monetary policy in the United States
from 1959 to 2007 from a different perspective.
We build and estimate a rich dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the U.S.
economy with both stochastic volatility and
parameter drifting in the Taylor rule that deter-
mines monetary policy. Then, we use the results
of our estimation to examine, through the lens
of the model, the recent monetary policy history
of the United States. Our attention is focused
primarily on understanding two fundamental
observations: (i) the rise and fall of the Great
Inflation from the late 1960s to the early 1980s,
the only significant peacetime inflation in U.S.
history, and (ii) the Great Moderation of business
cycle fluctuations that the U.S. economy experi-
enced between 1984 and 2007, as documented
by Kim and Nelson (1998), McConnell and Pérez-
Quirós (2000), and Stock and Watson (2003).
All the different elements in our exercise are
necessary. We need a DSGE model because we
are interested in counterfactuals. Thus, we require
a model that is structural in the sense of Hurwicz
(1962)—that is, invariant to interventions such
as the ones that we consider. We need a model
with stochastic volatility because, otherwise, any
changes in the variance of aggregate variables
would be interpreted as the consequence of vari-
ations in monetary policy. The evidence in Sims
and Zha (2006), Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramírez (2007), and Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008) points out that these changes in volatility
are first-order considerations when we explore
the data. We need a model with parameter drift-
ing in the monetary policy rule because we want
to introduce changes in policy that obey a fully
specified probability distribution, and not a once-
and-for-all change around 1979-80, as is often
postulated in the literature (for example, in
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000, and Lubick and
Schorfheide, 2004).
In addition to using our estimation to inter-
pret the recent monetary policy history of the
United States, we follow Sims and Zha’s (2006)
call to connect estimated changes to historical
events. (We are also inspired by Cogley and
Sargent, 2002 and 2005.) In particular, we discuss
how our estimation results relate to both the obser-
vations about the economy—for instance, how
our model interprets the effects of oil shocks—
and the written record.
Our main findings are that, although there is
strong evidence of changes in monetary policy
during Chairman Paul Volcker’s tenure at the Fed,
those changes contributed little to the Great
Moderation. Instead, changes in the volatility
of structural shocks account for most of it. Also,
although we find that monetary policy was differ-
ent under Volcker, we do not find much evidence
of a difference in monetary policy among the
tenures of Chairmen Arthur Burns, G. William
Miller, and Alan Greenspan. The reduction in the
volatility of aggregate variables after 1984 is attrib-
uted to the time-varying volatility of shocks. The
history for inflation is more subtle. According to
our estimated model, a more aggressive stance of
monetary policy would have reduced inflation
in the 1970s, but not completely eliminated it. In
addition, we find that volatile shocks (especially
Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramírez
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1 For instance, Allan Meltzer (2010), in his monumental A History
of the Federal Reserve, uses the summaries of the minutes of FOMC
meetings compiled by nine research assistants (volume 2, book 1,
page X). This shows how even a several-decades-long commitment
to getting acquainted with the archives is not enough to process
all the relevant information. Instead, it is necessary to rely on sum-
maries, with all the potential biases and distortions that they might
bring. This is, of course, not a criticism of Meltzer: He just proceeded,
as many other great historians do, by standing on the shoulders of
others. Otherwise, modern archival research would be plainly
impossible.those related to aggregate demand) were important
contributors to the Great Inflation.
Most of the material in this paper is based
on a much more extensive and detailed work by
Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, and
Rubio-Ramírez (2010), in which we (i) present the
DSGE model in all of its detail, (ii) characterize
the decision rules of the agents, (iii) build the
likelihood function, and (iv) estimate the model.
Here, we concentrate instead on understanding
recent U.S. monetary history through the lens of
our theory.




As we argued in the introduction, we need a
structural equilibrium model of the economy to
evaluate the importance of each of the different
mechanisms behind the evolution of inflation and
aggregate volatility in the United States over the
past several decades. However, while the previous
statement is transparent, it is much less clear how
to decide which particular elements of the model
to include. On the one hand, we want a model
that is sufficiently detailed to account for the
dynamics of the data reasonably well. But this goal
conflicts with the objective of having a parsimo-
nious and soundly microfounded description of
the aggregate economy.
Given our investigation, a default choice for
a model is a standard DSGE economy with nomi-
nal rigidities, such as the ones in Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) or Smets and
Wouters (2003). This class of models is currently
being used to inform policy in many central banks
and is a framework that has proven to be success-
ful at capturing the dynamics of the data. How  -
ever, we do not limit ourselves to a standard DSGE
model. Instead, we extend it in what we think
are important and promising directions by incor-
porating stochastic volatility into the structural
shocks and parameter drifting in the Taylor rule
that governs monetary policy.
Unfortunately, for our purposes, the model
has two weak points that we must acknowledge
before proceeding further: money and Calvo pric-
ing. Most DSGE models introduce a demand for
money through money in the utility function (MIA)
or cash in advance (CIA). By doing so, we endow
money with a special function without sound
justification. This hides inconsistencies that are
difficult to reconcile with standard economic
theory (Wallace, 2001). Moreover, the relation
between structures wherein money is essential
and the reduced forms embodied by MIA or CIA
is not clear. This means that we do not know
whether that relation is invariant to changes in
monetary policy or to the stochastic properties
of the shocks that hit the economy, such as the
ones we study. This is nothing more than the
Lucas critique dressed in a different way.
The second weakness of our DSGE model is
the use of Calvo pricing. Probably the best way
to think about Calvo pricing is as a convenient
reduced form of a more-complicated pricing mech-
anism that is easier to handle, thanks to its mem-
oryless properties. However, if we are entertaining
the idea that monetary policy or the volatility of
shocks has changed over time, it is exceedingly
difficult to believe that the parameters that control
Calvo pricing have been invariant over the same
period (see the empirical evidence that supports
this argument in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramírez, 2008).
However, getting around these two limitations
seems, at the moment, infeasible. Microfounded
models of money are either too difficult to work
with (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989) or rest in assump-
tions nearly as implausible as MIA (Lagos and
Wright, 2005) or that the data find too stringent
(Aruoba and Schorfheide, forthcoming). State-
dependent models of pricing are too cumbersome
computationally for estimation (Dotsey, King, and
Wolman, 1999).
So, with a certain reluctance, we use a main-
stream DSGE model with households; firms (a
labor packer, a final-good producer, and a contin-
uum of intermediate-good producers); a monetary
authority, the Federal Reserve, which implements
monetary policy through open market operations
following a Taylor rule; and nominal rigidities in
the form of Calvo pricing with partial indexation.
Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramírez
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We begin our discussion of the model with
households. We work with a continuum of them,
indexed by j. Households are different because
each supplies a specific type of labor in the mar-
ket: Some households are carpenters and some
households are economists. If, in addition, each
household has some market power over its own
wage and stands ready to supply any amount of
labor at posted prices, it is relatively easy to intro-
duce nominal rigidities in wages. Some house-
holds are able to change their wages and some
are not, and the relative demand for each type of
labor adjusts to compensate for these differences
in input prices.
At the same time, we do not want a compli-
cated model with heterogeneous agents that is
daunting to compute. We resort to two tricks to
get around that problem. First, we have a utility
function that is separable among consumption,
cjt, real money balances, mjt/pt, and hours worked,
ljt. Second, we have complete markets in Arrow
securities. Complete markets allow us to equate
the marginal utilities of consumption across all
households in all states of nature. And, since by
separability this marginal utility depends only on
consumption, all households will consume the
same amount of the final good. The result makes
aggregation trivial. Of course, it also has the
unpleasant feature that those households that do
not update their wages will work different num-
bers of hours than those that do. If, for example,
we have an increase in the average wage, those
households stuck with the old, lower wages will
work longer hours and have lower total utility.
This is the price we need to pay for tractability.
Given our previous choice of a separable
utility function and our desire to have a balanced
growth path for the economy (which requires a
marginal rate of substitution between labor and
consumption that is linear in consumption), we


















































where ￿0 is the conditional expectation operator,
ʲ is the discount factor for one quarter (the time
period for our model), h controls habit persistence,
and ˑ is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply
elasticity. In addition, we introduce two shifters
to preferences, common to all households: The
first is a shifter to intertemporal preference, dt,
that makes utility today more or less desirable.
This is a simple device to capture shocks to aggre-
gate demand. A prototypical example could be
increases in aggregate demand caused by fiscal
policy, an aspect of reality ignored in our model.
Another possibility is to think about dt as the con-
sequence of demographic shocks that propagate
over time. The second is a shifter to labor supply,
˕t. As emphasized by Hall (1997), this shock is
crucial for capturing the fluctuation of hours in
the data.
A simple way to parameterize the evolution
of the two shifters is to assume AR(1) processes:
where εdt ~ N￿0,1￿, and
where ε˕t ~ N￿0,1￿. The most interesting feature
of these processes is that the standard deviations
(SDs), ˃dt and ˃˕t, of the innovations, εdt and ε˕t,
evolve over time. This is the first place where we
introduce time-varying volatility in the model:
Sometimes the preference shifters are highly
volatile; sometimes they are less so. This chang-
ing volatility may reflect, for instance, the differ-
ent regimes of fiscal policy or the consequences
of demographic forces (Jaimovich and Siu, 2009).
We can specify many different processes for
˃dt and ˃˕t. A simple procedure is to assume that
˃dt and ˃˕t follow a Markov chain and take a finite
number of values. While this specification seems
straightforward, it is actually quite involved. The
distribution that it implies for ˃dt and ˃˕t is dis-
crete and, therefore, perturbation methods (such
as the ones that we use later) are ill designed to
deal with it. Such conditions would force us to
rely on global solution methods that are too slow
for estimation.
log log ,￿ d d t d t dt dt =+ − ˁ˃ ε 1
log log ,￿ ˕ˁ ˕ ˃ ε ˕˕ ˕ t t t t =+ −1
Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramírez
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esses in logs (to ensure the positivity of the SDs):
where udt ~ N￿0,1￿, and
where u˕t ~ N￿0,1￿. This specification is both
parsimonious (with only four new parameters,
ˁ˃d, ˁ˃˕, ʷd, and ʷ˕) and rather flexible. Because
of these advantages, we impose the same specifi-
cation for the other three time-varying SDs in the
model that appear below (the ones affecting an
investment-specific technological shock, a neutral
technology shock, and a monetary policy shock).
Hereafter, agents perfectly observe the structural
shocks and the level and innovation to the SDs
and have rational expectations about their sto-
chastic properties.
Households keep a rich portfolio: They own
(physical) capital, kjt; nominal government bonds,
bjt, that pay a gross return Rt–1; Arrow securities,
ajt+1, which pay one unit of consumption in event
ˉjt+1,t traded at time t at unitary price qjt+1,t; and
cash.
The evolution of capital deserves some
description. Given a depreciation rate δ, the
amount of capital owned by household j at the
end of period t is
Investment, xjt, is multiplied by a term that
depends on a quadratic adjustment cost function,
written in deviations with respect to the balanced
growth rate of investment, ʛx, with adjustment
parameter ʺ and an investment-specific technol-
ogy level ﾵt. This technology level evolves as a
random walk in logs:
log log log ,￿ ˃ˁ ˃ ˁ ˃ ʷ ˃˃ dt d dt d dt d d u = − ()++ − 1 1
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log log ,￿ µµ ˃ ε µµ µ t t t t =+ + − Λ 1
where εﾵt ~ N￿0,1￿ with drift ʛﾵ and innovation
εﾵt, whose SD ˃ﾵt evolves according to our favorite
autoregressive process:
where uﾵt ~ N￿0,1￿.
We introduce this shock convinced by the
evidence in Greenwood, Herkowitz, and Krusell
(1997) that this is a key mechanism to understand-
ing aggregate fluctuations in the United States
over the past 50 years.
Thus, the jth household’s budget constraint is
where wjt is the real wage, rt is the real rental
price of capital, ujt > 0 is the rate of use of capital,
ﾵt
–1ʦ[ujt] is the cost of using capital at rate ujt in
terms of the final good, ﾵtis an investment-specific
technology level, Tt is a lump-sum transfer, and
Ft is the profits of the firms in the economy. We
postulate a simple quadratic form for ʦ[.],
and normalize u, the utilization rate in the bal-
anced growth path of the economy, to 1. This
imposes the restriction that the parameter ʦ1 must
satisfy ʦ1 = ʦ′[1] = r ˜, where r ˜ is the balanced
growth path rental price of capital (rescaled by
technological progress, as we explain later).
Of all the choice variables of the households,
the only one that requires special attention is
hours. As we explained previously, each house-
hold j supplies its own specific type of labor.
This labor is aggregated by a labor packer into
homogeneous labor, lt
d, according to a constant
elasticity of substitution technology,
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takes all the individual wages, wjt, and the wage
wt for lt
d as given.
The household decides, given the demand
function for its type of labor generated by the
labor packer,
which wage maximizes its utility and stands ready
to supply any amount of labor at that wage. How  -
ever, when it chooses the wage, the household is
subject to a nominal rigidity: a Calvo pricing
mechanism with partial indexation. At the start
of every quarter, a fraction 1 – ʸw of households
are randomly selected and allowed to reoptimize
their wages. All other households can only index
their wages to past inflation with an indexation
parameter ˇw ￿ [0,1].
2.2 Firms
In addition to the labor packer, we have two
other types of firms in this economy. The first, the
final-good producer, is a perfectly competitive
firm that aggregates a continuum of intermediate
goods with the technology:
(2)  
This firm takes as given all intermediate-good
prices, pti, and the final-good price, pt, and gen-
erates a demand function for each intermediate
good:
(3)  
Second, we have the intermediate-good pro-
ducers, each of which has access to a Cobb-
Douglas production function,
where kit–1 is the capital, lit
d is the packed labor
rented by the firm, and At (our fourth structural
shock) is the neutral productivity level, which
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where εAt ~ N￿0,1￿ with drift ʛA and innovation εAt.
We keep the same specification for the SD of this
innovation as we did for all previous volatilities:
where uAt ~ N￿0,1￿.
The quantity sold of the good is determined
by the demand function (equation (3)). Given
equation (3), the intermediate-good producers
set prices to maximize profits. As was the case
for households, intermediate-good producers are
subject to a nominal rigidity in the form of Calvo
pricing. In each quarter, a proportion of them,
1 – ʸp, can reoptimize their prices. The remaining
fraction ʸp indexes their prices by a fraction 
ˇ ￿ [0,1] of past inflation.
2.3 The Policy Rule of the Federal
Reserve
In our model, the Federal Reserve implements
monetary policy through open market operations
(that generate lump-sum transfers, Tt, to maintain
a balanced budget). In doing so, the Fed follows
a modified Taylor rule that targets the ratio of
nominal gross return, Rt, of government bonds
over the balanced growth path gross return, R:
This rule depends on (i) the past Rt–1, which
smooths changes over time; (ii) the “inflation gap,”
ʠt/ʠ, where ʠ is the balanced growth path of
inflation2; (iii) the “growth gap,” which is the ratio
log log ,￿ A A t A t At At =+ + − Λ 1 ˃ε
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2 Here we are being careful with our words: ʠ is inflation in the
balanced growth path, not the target of inflation in the stochastic
steady state. As we will see later, we solve the model using a second-
order approximation. The second-order terms move the mean of
the ergodic distribution of inflation, which corresponds in our view
to the usual view of the inflation target, away from the balanced
growth path level. We could have expressed the policy rule in terms
of this mean of the ergodic distribution, but it would amount to
solving a complicated fixed-point problem (for every inflation level,
we would need to solve the model and check that indeed this is
the mean of the ergodic distribution), which is too complicated a
task for the potential benefits we can derive from it.between the growth rate of the economy, yt/yt–1,
and ʛy, the balanced path gross growth rate of yt,
dictated by the drifts of neutral and investment-
specific technological change; and (iv) a monetary
policy shock, ʾt = exp
˃m,tεmt, with an innova  tion
εmt ~ N￿0,1￿ and SD of the innovation, ˃m,t, that
evolves as
Note that, since we are dealing with a general
equilibrium model, once the Fed has chosen a
value of ʠ, R is not a free target, as it is determined
by technology, preferences, and ʠ.
We introduce monetary policy changes
through a parameter drift over the responses of
Rt to inflation, ʳ ʠ,t, and growth gaps, ʳy,t:
where εˀt ~ N￿0,1￿ and
where εyt~ N￿0,1￿.
In preliminary estimations, we discovered
that, while other parameters such as ʳR could also
be changing, the likelihood function of the model
did not react much to that possibility and, thus,
we eliminated those channels.
Our parameter-drifting specification tries to
capture mainly two different phenomena. First,
changes in the composition of the voting members
of the FOMC (through changes in governors and
in the rotating votes of presidents of regional
Reserve Banks) may affect how strongly the FOMC
responds to inflation and output growth because
of variations in the political-economic equilibrium
in the committee.3 Similarly, changes in staff may
have effects as long as their views have an impact
on the voting members through briefings and
other, less-structured interactions. This may have
log log log . , ˃ˁ ˃ ˁ ˃ ʷ ˃ ˃ mt m mt m m t m m u = − ()++ − 1 1
log log log , ʳˁ ʳ ˁ ʳ ʷ ε ʳʳ π π ΠΠ Π ΠΠ t t t =− ()++ − 1 1
log log log ,￿ ʳˁ ʳ ˁ ʳ ʷ ε ʳʳ yt y yt y yt y y =− ()++ − 1 1
been particularly true in the late 1960s, when a
majority of staff economists embraced Keynesian
policies and the MIT-Penn-Federal Reserve System
(MPS) model was built.4 The second phenomenon
is the observation that, even if we keep constant
the members of the FOMC, their reading of the
priorities and capabilities of monetary policy may
evolve (or be more or less influenced by the gen-
eral political climate of the nation). We argue
below that this is a good description of Martin,
who changed his beliefs about how strongly the
Fed could fight inflation in the late 1960s, or of
Greenspan’s growing conviction in the mid-1990s
that the long-run growth rate of the U.S. economy
had risen.
While this second channel seems well
described by a continuous drift in the parameters
(beliefs plausibly evolving slowly), changes in
the voting members, in particular the Chairman,
might potentially be better understood as discrete
jumps in ʳ ʠ,t and ʳy,t. In fact, our smoothed path
of ʳ ʠ,t, which we estimate from the data, gives
some support to this view. But in addition to our
pragmatic consideration that computing models
with discrete jumps is hard, we argue in Section 6
that, historically, changes have occurred more
slowly and even new Chairmen have required
some time before taking a decisive lead on the
FOMC (Goodfriend and King, 2005).
In Section 7, we discuss other objections to
our form of parameter drifting—in particular the
objection to the assumption that agents observe
the changes in parameters without problem, its
exogeneity, or its avoidance of open economy
considerations.
2.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
The model is closed by finding an expression
for aggregate demand,
and another for aggregate supply,
y c x u k t
d
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3 According to Walter Heller, President Kennedy clearly stated,
“About the only power I have over the Federal Reserve is the power
of appointment, and I want to use it” (cited by Bremner, 2004, 
p. 160). The slowly changing composition of the Board of Governors
may lead to situations, such as the one in February 1986 (dis-
cussed later in the text), when Volcker was outvoted by Ronald
Reagan’s appointees on the Board.
4 The MPS model is the high-water mark of traditional Keynesian
macroeconometric models in the Cowles tradition. The MPS model
was used operationally by staff economists at the Fed from the
early 1970s to the mid-1990s (see Brayton et al., 1997).where
is demanded labor,
is the aggregate loss of labor input induced by
wage dispersion, and
is the aggregate loss of efficiency induced by price
dispersion of the intermediate goods. By market
clearing, yt = yt
d = yt
s.
The definition of “equilibrium” for this model
is rather standard: It is just the path of aggregate
quantities and prices that maximize the problems
of households and firms, the government follows
its Taylor rule, and markets clear. But while the
definition of equilibrium is straightforward, its
computation is not.
3. SOLUTION AND LIKELIHOOD
EVALUATION
The solution of our model is challenging. We
have 19 state variables, 5 innovations to the struc-
tural shocks (εdt, ε˕t, εAt, εﾵt, εmt), 2 innovations to
the parameter drifts (εˀt, εyt), and 5 innovations to
the volatility shocks (udt, u˕t, uﾵt, uAt, umt), for a
total of 31 variables that we must consider.
A vector of 19 states makes it impossible to
use value-function iteration or projection methods
(finite elements or Chebyshev polynomials). The
curse of dimensionality is too acute even for the
most powerful of existing computers. Standard
linearization techniques do not work either:
Stochastic volatility is inherently a nonlinear
process. If we solved the model by linearization,
all terms associated with stochastic volatility
would disappear because of certainty equivalence
y
v
A u k l t
s
t
p t t t t












































and our investigation would be essentially
worthless.
Nearly by default, then, using perturbation
to obtain a higher-order approximation to the
equilibrium dynamics of our model is the only
option. A second-order approximation includes
terms that depend on the level of volatility. Thus,
these terms capture the responses of agents (house-
holds and firms) to changes in volatility. At the
same time, a second-order approximation can be
found sufficiently fast, which is of the utmost
importance since we want to estimate the model
and that forces us to solve it repeatedly for many
different parameter values. Thus, a second-order
approximation is an interesting compromise
between accuracy and speed.
The idea of perturbation is simple. Instead of
the exact decision rule of the agents in the model,
we use a second-order Taylor expansion to the
rule around the steady state. That Taylor expan-
sion depends on the state variables and on the
innovations. However, we do not know the coef-
ficients multiplying each term of the expansion.
Fortunately, we can find them by an application
of the implicit function theorem as follows (see
also Judd, 1998, and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2006).
First, we write all the equations describing the
equilibrium of the model (optimality conditions
for the agents, budget and resource constraints,
the Taylor rule, and the laws of motion for the
different stochastic processes). Second, we rescale
all the variables to remove the balanced growth
path induced by the presence of the drifts in the
evolution of neutral and investment-specific tech-
nology. Third, we find the steady state implied by
the rescaled variables. Fourth, we linearize the
equilibrium conditions around the steady state
found in the previous step. Then, we solve for the
unknown coefficients in this linearization, which
happen to be, by the implicit function theorem,
the coefficients of the first-order terms of the deci-
sion rules in the rescaled variables that we are
looking for (which can be easily rearranged to
deliver the decision rules in the original variables).
The next step is to take a second-order approxi-
mation of the equilibrium conditions, plugging
in the terms found before, and solve for the coef-
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rules.
While we could keep iterating in this proce-
dure for as long as we want, Aruoba, Fernández-
Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramírez (2006) show that,
for the basic stochastic neoclassical growth model
(the backbone of our model) calibrated to the U.S.
data, a second-order approximation delivers excel-
lent accuracy at great computational speed. In our
actual computation, we undertake the symbolic
derivatives of the equilibrium conditions using
Mathematica 6.0. The code generates all of the
relevant expressions and exports them automat-
ically into Fortran files. Then, Fortran sends
particular parameter values in each step of the
estimation, evaluates those expressions, and
determines the terms of the Taylor expansions
that we need.
Once we have the approximated solution to
the model, given some parameter values, we use
it to build a state-space representation of the
dynamics of states and observables. This repre-
sentation is, as we argued before, nonlinear and
hence standard techniques such as the Kalman
filter cannot be applied to evaluate the associated
likelihood function. Instead, we resort to a simu-
lation method known as the particle filter, as
applied to DSGE models by Fernández-Villaverde
and Rubio-Ramírez (2007). The particle filter gen-
erates a simulation of different states of the model
and evaluates the probability of the innovations
that make these simulated states explain the
observables. These probabilities are also called
weights. A simple application of a law of large
numbers tells us that the mean of the weights is
an evaluation of the likelihood. The secret of the
success of the procedure is that, instead of per-
forming the simulation over the whole sample,
we perform it only period by period, resampling
from the set of simulated state variables accord-
ing to the weights we just found. This sequential
structure, which makes the particle filter a case of
a more general class of algorithms called sequen-
tial Monte Carlo methods, ensures that the simu-
lation of the state variables remains centered on
the true but unknown value of the state variables.
This dramatically limits the numerical variance
of the procedure.
Now that we have an evaluation of the likeli-
hood of the model given observables, we only
need to search over different parameter values
according to our favorite estimation algorithm.
This can be done in two ways. One is with a reg-
ular maximum likelihood algorithm: We look for
a global maximum of the likelihood. This proce-
dure is complicated by the fact that the evaluation
of the likelihood function that we obtain from the
particle filter is nondifferentiable with respect to
the parameters because of the inherent discrete-
ness of the resampling step. An easier alternative,
and one that allows the introduction of presample
information, is to follow a Bayesian approach. In
this route, we specify a prior over the parameters,
multiply the likelihood by it, and sample from the
resulting posterior by means of a random-walk
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. In this paper, we
choose this second route. In our estimation, how  -
ever, we do not take full advantage of presample
information since we impose flat priors to facili-
tate the communication of the results to other
researchers: The shape of our posterior distribu-
tions will be proportional to the likelihood. We
must note, however, that relying on flat priors
forces us to calibrate some parameters to values
typically used in the literature (see Fernández-
Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez,
2010 [FGR hereafter], for the values and justifica-
tion of the calibrated values).
While our description of the solution and
estimation method has been necessarily brief,
the reader is invited to check FGR for additional
details. In particular, FGR characterize the struc-
ture of the higher-order approximations, showing
that many of the relevant terms are zero and
exploiting this result to quickly solve for the inno-
vations that explain the observables given some
states. This result, proved for a general class of
DSGE models with stochastic volatility, is bound to
have wide application in all cases where stochas-
tic volatility is an important aspect of the problem.
4. ESTIMATION
To estimate our model, we use five time series
for the U.S. economy: (i) the relative price of
Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramírez
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2010 319investment goods with respect to the price of
consumption goods, (ii) the federal funds rate,
(iii) real per capita output growth, (iv) the con-
sumer price index, and (v) real wages per capita.
Our sample covers 1959:Q1 to 2007:Q1.
Figure 1 plots three of the five series: inflation,
(per capita) output growth, and the federal funds
rate—the three series most commonly discussed
when commentators talk about monetary policy.
By refreshing our memory about their evolution
in the sample, we can frame the rest of our dis-
cussion. For ease of reading, each vertical bar
corresponds to the tenure of one Fed Chairman:
Martin, Burns-Miller (we merge these two because
of Miller’s short tenure), Volcker, Greenspan, and
Bernanke.
The top panel shows the history of the Great
Inflation: From the late 1960s to the mid-1980s,
the U.S. experienced its only significant inflation
in peace time, with peaks of around 12 to 14 per-
cent during the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks. The
middle panel shows the Great Moderation: A sim-
ple inspection of the series after 1984 reveals a
much smaller amplitude of fluctuations (espe-
cially between 1993 and 2000) than before that
date. The Great Inflation and the Great Moderation
are the two main empirical facts to keep in mind
for the rest of the paper. The bottom panel shows
the federal funds rate, which follows a pattern
similar to inflation: It rises in the 1970s (although
less than inflation during the earlier years of the
decade and more during the last years) and stays
much lower in the 1990s, reaching historical
minima by the end of the sample.
The point estimates we get from our posterior
distribution agree with other estimates in the lit-
erature. For example, we document a fair amount
of nominal rigidities in the economy. In any case,
we refer the reader to FGR to avoid a lengthy dis-
cussion. Here, we report only the modes and SDs
of the posterior distributions associated with the
parameters governing stochastic volatility (Table 1)
and policy (Table 2). In our view, those parame-
ters are the most relevant for our reading of the
recent history of monetary policy in the United
States.
The main lesson from Table 1 is that the scale
parameters, ʷi, are clearly positive and bounded
away from zero, confirming the presence of time-
variant volatility in the data. Shocks to the volatil-
ity of the intertemporal preference shifter, ˃d, are
the most persistent (also, the SDs are tight enough
to suggest that we are not suffering from serious
identification problems). The innovations to the
volatility of the intratemporal labor shock, ʷ˕,
are large in magnitude, which suggests that labor
supply shocks may have played an important role
during the Great Inflation by moving the marginal
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Table 1
Posterior Distributions: Parameters of the Stochastic Processes for Volatility Shocks
Parameter
log˃d log˃˕ log˃ﾵ log˃A log˃m
–1.9834 –2.4983 –6.0283 –3.9013 –6.000
(0.0726) (0.0917) (0.1278) (0.0745) (0.1471)
ˁ˃d ˁ˃˕ ˁ˃ﾵ ˁ˃A ˁ˃m
0.9506 0.1275 0.7508 0.2411 0.8550
(0.0298) (0.0032) (0.035) (0.005) (0.0231)
ʷd ʷ˕ ʷﾵ ʷA ʷm
0.3246 2.8549 0.4716 0.7955 1.1034
(0.0083) (0.0669) (0.006) (0.013) (0.0185) 
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramírez
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Time Series for Inflation, Output Growth, and the Federal Funds Ratecost of intermediate-good producers. Finally, the
estimates for the volatility process governing
investment-specific productivity suggest that
such shocks are important in accounting for
business cycles fluctuations in the United States
(Fisher, 2006).
The results from Table 2 indicate that the
central bank smooths interest rates (ʳR > 0). The
parameter ʳ ʠ is the average magnitude of the
response to inflation in the Taylor rule. Its esti-
mated value (1.045 in levels) is just enough to
guarantee determinacy in the model (Woodford,
2003).5 The size of the innovations to the drift-
ing inflation parameter, ʷˀ, reaffirms our view of
a time-dependent response to inflation in mone-
tary policy. The estimates for ʳy,t (the response
to output deviations in the Taylor rule) are not
reported because preliminary attempts at estima-
tion convinced us that ʷy was nil. Hence, in our
next exercises, we set ˁʳy and ʷy to zero.
5. TWO FIGURES
In this section, we present two figures that
show us much about the evolution and effects of
monetary policy: (i) the estimated smoothed path
of ʳ ʠt over our sample and (ii) the evolution dur-
ing the same years of a measure of the real interest
rate. In the next section, we map these figures into
the historical record.
Figure 2, perhaps the most important figure
in this paper, plots the smoothed estimate of the
evolution of the response of monetary policy to
inflation plus or minus a 2-SD interval given our
point estimates of the structural parameters. The
message of Figure 2 is straightforward. According
to our model, at the arrival of the Kennedy admin-
istration, the response of monetary policy to
inflation was around its estimated mean, slightly
over 1.6 It grew more or less steadily during the
1960s, until reaching a peak at the end of 1967
and beginning of 1968. Subsequently, ʳ ʠt fell so
quickly that it was below 1 by 1971. For nearly
all of the 1970s, ʳ ʠt stayed below 1 and picked up
only with the arrival of Volcker. Interestingly, the
two oil shocks did not have an impact on the esti-
mated ʳ ʠt. The parameter stayed high throughout
the Volcker years and fell after a few quarters into
Greenspan’s tenure, when it returned to levels
even lower than during the Burns and Miller years.
The likelihood function favors an evolving mone-
tary policy even after introducing stochastic
volatility in the model. In FGR, we assess this
statement more carefully with several measures
of model fit, including the construction of Bayes
factors and the computation of Bayesian infor-
mation criteria between different specifications
of the model.
The reader could argue, with some justifica-
tion, that we have estimated a large DSGE model
and that it is not clear what is driving the results
and what variation in the data is identifying the
movements in monetary policy. While a fully
worked-out identification analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper, as a simple reality check, we
plot in Figure 3 a measure of the (short-term)
5 In this model, local determinacy depends only on the mean of ʳʠ.
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Table 2
Posterior Distribution: Policy Parameters
Parameter
ʳR logʳy ʠ logʳʠ ʷˀ
0.7855 –1.4034 1.0005 0.0441 0.1479
(0.0162) (0.0498) (0.0043) (0.0005) (0.002)
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.
6 This number nearly coincides with the estimate of Romer and
Romer (2002a) of the coefficient using data from the 1950s.Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramírez
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Real Interest Rate (Federal Funds Rate Minus Inflation)real interest rate defined as the federal funds rate
minus current inflation.7
This figure shows that Martin kept the real
interest rate at positive values around 2 percent
during the 1960s (with a peak by the end, which
corresponds with the peak of our estimated ʳ ʠt).
However, during the 1970s, the real interest rate
was often negative and only rarely above 2 percent,
a rather conservative lower bound on the balanced
growth real interest rate given our point estimates.
The likelihood function can interpret those obser-
vations only as a very low ʳ ʠt (remember that the
Taylor principle calls for increases in the real
interest rate when inflation rises; that is, nominal
interest rates must grow more than inflation). Real
interest rates skyrocketed with the arrival of
Volcker, reaching a historic record of 13 percent
by 1981:Q2. After that date, they were never even
close to zero, and only in two quarters were they
below 3 percent. Again, the likelihood function
can interpret that observation only as a high ʳ ʠt.
The Greenspan era is more complicated because
real interest rates were not particularly low in the
1990s. However, output growth was very positive,
which pushed the interest rates up in the Taylor
rule. Since the federal funds rate was not as high
as the policy rule would have predicted with a
high ʳ ʠt, the smoothed estimate of the parameter
is lowered. During the 2000s, real interest rates
close to zero were enough, by themselves, to keep
ʳ ʠt low.
6. READING MONETARY HISTORY
THROUGH THE LENS OF OUR
MODEL
Now that we have our model and our esti-
mates of the structural parameters, we smooth
the structural and volatility shocks implied by
the data and use them to read the recent monetary
history of the United States. Somewhat conven-
tionally, we organize our discussion around the
different Chairmen of the Fed from Martin to
Greenspan—except for Miller, whom we group
with Burns because of his short tenure.
One fundamental lesson from this exercise is
that Figure 2 can successfully guide our interpre-
tation of policy from 1959 to 2007. We document
how both Martin and Volcker believed that infla-
tion was dangerous and that the Fed had both the
responsibility and the power to fight it, although
growing doubts about that power overcame Martin
during his last term as Chairman. Burns, on the
other hand, thought the costs of inflation were
lower than the cost of a recession triggered by
disinflation. In any case, he was rather skeptical
about the Fed’s ability to successfully disinflate.
Greenspan, despite his constant warnings about
inflation, had in practice a much more nuanced
attitude. According to our estimated model, good
positive shocks to the economy gave him the
privilege of skipping a daunting test of his resolve.
Because by using a DSGE model we have a
complete set of structural and volatility shocks,
in FGR, we complete this analysis with the con-
struction of counterfactual exercises. In those exer-
cises, we build artificial histories of economies
in which some source of variation has been elimi-
nated or modified in an illustrative manner. For
example, we can evaluate how the economy
would have behaved in the absence of changes
in the volatility of the structural shocks or if the
average monetary policy of one period had been
applied in another. By interpreting those counter-
factual histories, we attribute most of the defeat
of the Great Inflation to monetary policy under
Volcker and most of the Great Moderation after
1984 to good shocks. We incorporate information
from those counterfactuals as we move along.
Our exercise in this section is closely related
to the work of Christina and David Romer (1989;
2002a,b; 2004), except that we attack the problem
from exactly the opposite perspective. While they
let their narrative approach guide their empirical
specification and like to keep a flexible relation
with equilibrium models, we start from a tightly
parameterized DSGE model of the U.S. economy
and use the results of our estimation to read the
narrative told by the documents. We see both
strategies as complementary since each can teach
us much of interest. Quite remarkably, given the
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7 Since inflation is nearly a random walk (Stock and Watson,
2007), its current value is an excellent proxy for its expected value.
In any case, our argument is fully robust to slightly different defi-
nitions of the real interest rate.different research designs, many of our conclu-
sions are similar to the views expressed by Romer
and Romer.
6.1 The Martin Era: Resistance and
Surrender
William McChesney Martin, the Chairman of
the Fed between April 2, 1951, and January 31,
1970, knew how to say no. On December 3, 1965,
he dared to raise the discount rate for the first time
in more than five years, despite warnings from
the Treasury secretary, Henry Fowler, and the
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors,
Gardner Ackley, that President Lyndon Johnson
disapproved of such a move. Johnson, a man not
used to seeing his orders ignored, was angered
by Martin’s unwelcome display of independence
and summoned him to a meeting at his Texas
ranch. There, for over an hour, he tried to corner
the Chairman of the Fed with the infamous bul-
lying tactics that had made him a master of the
Senate in years past. Martin, however, held his
ground and carried the day: The raise would stand.
Robert Bremner starts his biography of Martin
with this story.8 The choice is most appropriate.
The history of this confrontation illustrates better
than any other event our econometric results.
The early 1960s were the high years of
Martin’s tenure. The era of the “New Economics”
combined robust economic growth, in excess of
5 percent, and low inflation, below 3 percent.
According to our estimated model, this moderate
inflation was, in part, a reflection of Martin’s views
about economic policy. Bremner (2004, p. 122)
summarizes Martin’s guiding principles this way:
Stable prices were crucial for the correct working
of a market economy and the Fed’s main task was
to maintain that stability. In Martin’s own words,
“the Fed has a responsibility to use the powers
it possesses over economic events to dampen
excesses in economic activity [by] keeping the
use of credit in line with resources available for
production of goods and services.”9 Martin was
also opposed to the idea (popular at the time)
that the U.S. economy had a built-in bias toward
inflation, a bias the Fed had to accommodate
through monetary policy. Sumner Slichter, an
influential professor of economics at Harvard,
was perhaps the most vocal proponent of the
built-in bias hypothesis. In Martin’s own words,
“I refuse to raise the flag of defeatism in the battle
of inflation” and “there is no validity whatever
in the idea that any inflation, once accepted, can
be confined to moderate proportions.”10 As we
will see in the next subsection, this opposition
stands in stark contrast to Burns’s pessimistic
view of inflation, which had many points of con-
tact with Slichter’s.
Our estimates of ʳ ʠ,t, above 1 and growing
during the period, clearly tell us that Martin was
doing precisely that: working to keep inflation low.
Our result also agrees with Romer and Romer’s
(2002a) narrative and statistical evidence regard-
ing the behavior of the Fed during the late 1950s.
We must not forget, however, that our estimates
in FGR suggest as well that the good performance
of the economy from 1961 to 1965 was also the
consequence of good positive shocks.
The stand against inflation started to be tested
around 1966. Intellectually, more and more voices
had been raised since the late 1950s defending
the notion that an excessive concern with infla-
tion was keeping the economy from working at
full capacity. Bremner (2004, p. 138) cites Walter
Heller and Paul Samuelson’s statements before
the Joint Economic Committee in February 1959
as examples of an attitude that would soon gain
strength. The following year, Samuelson and
Robert Solow’s (1960) classic paper about the
Phillips curve was taken by many as providing
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8 Bremner (2004, pp. 1-2). This was not the only clash of Martin with
a president of the United States. In late 1952, Martin bumped into
Harry Truman leaving the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City.
To Martin’s “Good afternoon,” Truman wryly replied, “Traitor!”
Truman was deeply displeased by how the Fed had implemented
the accord of March 3, 1951, between the Fed and the Treasury that
ended the interest rate peg in place since 1942 (Bremner, 2004, p. 91).
9 Martin’s testimony to the Joint Economic Committee, February 5,
1957 (cited by Bremner 2004, p. 123).
10 The first quotation is from the New York Times, March 16, 1957,
where Martin was expressing dismay for having reached a 2 percent
rate of inflation. The second quotation is from the Wall Street
Journal, August 19, 1957. Martin also thought that Keynes himself
had changed his views on inflation after the war (they had talked
privately on several occasions) and that, consequently, Keynesian
economists were overemphasizing the benefits of inflation. See
Bremner (2004, pp. 128 and 229).an apparently sound empirical justification for
a much more sanguine position with respect to
inflation: “In order to achieve the nonperfec-
tionist’s goal of high enough output to give us
no more than 3 percent unemployment, the price
index might have to rise by as much as 4 to 5 per-
cent per year. That much price rise would seem
to be the necessary cost of high employment and
production in the years immediately ahead”
(Samuelson and Solow, 1960, p. 192).11 Heller’s
and Tobin’s arrival on the Council of Economic
Advisors transformed the critics into the insiders.
The pressures on monetary policy were con-
tained during Kennedy’s administration, in good
part because C. Douglas Dillon, the secretary of
the Treasury and a Rockefeller Republican, sided
on many occasions with Martin against Heller.12
But the changing composition of the Board of
Governors and the arrival of Johnson, with his
expansionary fiscal programs, the escalation of
the Vietnam War, and the departure of Dillon from
the Treasury Department, changed the weights of
power.
While the effects of the expansion of federal
spending in the second half of the 1960s often
play a central role in the narrative of the start of
the Great Inflation, the evolution of the Board of
Governors has received less attention. Heller
realized that, by carefully selecting the governors,
he could shape monetary policy without the
need to ease Martin out. This was an inspired
observation, since up to that moment, the gover-
nors who served under the Chairman had played
an extremely small role in monetary policy and
the previous administrations had, consequently,
shown little interest in their selection. The strat-
egy worked. Heller’s first choice, George W.
Mitchell, would become a leader of those prefer-
ring a more expansionary monetary policy on
the FOMC.
By 1964, Martin was considerably worried
about inflation. He told Johnson: “I think we’re
heading toward an inflationary mess that we won’t
be able to pull ourselves out of.”13 In 1965, he
ran into serious problems with the president, as
discussed at the beginning of this section. The
problems appeared again in 1966 with the appoint-
ment of Brimmer as a governor against Martin’s
recommendation. During all this time, Martin
stuck to his guns, trying to control inflation even
if it meant erring on the side of overtightening the
economy. Our estimated ʳ ʠ,t captures this attitude
with an increase from around 1965 to around 1968.
But by the summer of 1968, Martin gave in
to an easing of monetary policy after the tax sur-
charge was passed by Congress. As reported by
Hetzel (2008), at the time, the FOMC was divided
into two camps: members more concerned about
inflation (such as Al Hayes, the president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and members
more concerned about output growth (Brimmer,14
Maisel,15 and Mitchell, all three appointees of
Kennedy and Johnson). Martin, always a seeker
of consensus, was growlingly incapable of carry-
ing the day.16 Perhaps Martin felt that the politi-
cal climate had moved away from a commitment
11 The message of the paper is, however, much more subtle than
laying down a simple textbook Phillips curve. As Samuelson and
Solow (1960) also say in the next page of their article (p. 193), “All
of our discussion has been phrased in short-run terms, dealing
with what might happen in the next few years. It would be wrong,
though, to think that our Figure 2 menu that relates obtainable price
and unemployment behavior will maintain its shape in the longer
run. What we do in a policy way during the next few years might
cause it to shift in a definite way.”
12 In particular, Dillon’s support for Martin’s reappointment for a
new term in 1963 was pivotal. Hetzel (2008, p. 69) suggests that
President Kennedy often sided with Dillon and Martin over Heller
to avoid a gold crisis on top of the problems with the Soviet Union
over Cuba and Berlin.
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13 Oral history interview with Martin, Lyndon B. Johnson Library
(quoted by Bremner, 2004, p. 191).
14 Brimmer is also the first African American to have served as a
governor and was, for a while, a faculty member at the University
of Pennsylvania.
15 Sherman Maisel was a member of the Board of Governors between
1965 and 1972. Maisel, a professor at the Haas School of Business
at the University of California–Berkeley, has the honor of being the
first academic economist appointed as a governor after Adolph
Miller, one of the original governors in 1914. As he explained in
his book, Managing the Dollar (one of the first inside looks at the
Fed and still a fascinating read today), Maisel was also a strong
believer in the Phillips curve: “There is a trade-off between idle
men and a more stable value of the dollar. A conscious decision
must be made as to how much unemployment and loss of output
is acceptable in order to get smaller price rises” (Maisel, 1973, 
p. 285). Maisel’s academic and Keynesian background merged in
his sponsoring of the MPS model mentioned in Section 2.
16 On one occasion, Maisel felt strongly enough to call a press con-
ference to explain his dissenting vote in favor of more expansion.to fight inflation.17 Or perhaps he was just
exhausted after many years running the Fed (at
the last meeting of the FOMC in which he partici-
pated, he expressed feelings of failure for not
having controlled inflation). No matter what the
exact reason was, monetary policy eased drasti-
cally in comparison with what was being called
for by the Taylor rule with a ʳ ʠ,t above 1. Thus,
our estimated ʳ ʠ,t starts to plunge in the spring
of 1968, reflecting that the increases in the federal
funds rate passed at the end of 1968 and in 1969
were, according to our estimated Taylor rule, not
aggressive enough given the state of the economy.
The genie of the Great Inflation was out of the
bottle.
6.2 The Burns-Miller Era: Monetary
Policy in the Time of Turbulence
Arthur F. Burns started his term as Chairman
of the Fed on February 1, 1970. A professor of
economics at Columbia University and the presi-
dent of the National Bureau of Economic Research
between 1957 and 1967, Burns was the first aca-
demic economist to hold the chairmanship. All
the previous nine Chairmen had been bankers or
lawyers. However, any hope that his economics
education would make him take an aggressive
stand against the inflation brewing during the
last years of Martin’s tenure quickly disappeared.
The federal funds rate fell from an average of
8.02 percent during 1970:Q1 to 4.12 percent by
1970:Q4. The justification for those reductions
was the need to jump-start the economy, which
was stacked in the middle of the first recession
in nearly a decade, since December 1969. But
since inflation stayed at 4.55 percent by the end
of 1970, the reduction in the nominal rate meant
that real interest rates sank into the negative
region.
Our smoothed estimate of ʳ ʠ,t in Figure 2
responds to this behavior of the Fed by quickly
dropping during the same period. This indicates
that the actual reduction in the federal funds rate
was much more aggressive than the reduction
suggested by the (important) fall in output growth
and the (moderate) fall in inflation. Furthermore,
the likelihood function accounts for the persistent
fall in the real interest rate with a persistent fall
in ʳ ʠ,t.
Burns did little over the next few years to
return ʳ ʠ,t to higher values. Even if the federal
funds rate had started to grow by the end of 1971
(after the 90-day price controls announced on
August 15 of that year as part of Nixon’s New
Economic Policy) and reached new highs in 1973
and 1974, it barely kept up with inflation. The
real interest rate was not above our benchmark
value of 2 percent until the second quarter of 1976.
Later, in 1977, the federal funds rate was only
raised cautiously, despite the evidence of strong
output growth after the 1973-75 recession and
that inflation remained relatively high.
Our econometric results come about because
the Taylor rule does not care about the level of
the interest rate in itself, but by how much infla-
tion deviates from ʠ. If ʳ ʠ,t > 1, the increases in
the federal funds rate are bigger than the
increases in inflation. This is not what happened
during Burns’s tenure: The real interest rate was
above the cutoff of 2 percent that we proposed
before only in three quarters: his first two quar-
ters as Chairman (1970:Q2 and 1970:Q3) and in
1976:Q2. This observation, by itself, should be
sufficient proof of the stand of monetary policy
during the period.18
Burns’s successor, William Miller, did not
have time to retract these policies in the brief
interlude of his tenure, from March 8, 1978, to
August 6, 1979. But he also did not have either
the capability, since his only experience in the
conduct of monetary policy was serving as a
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17 Meltzer (2010, p. 549) points out that Martin and the other Board
members might have been worried by Johnson’s appointment, at
the suggestion of Arthur Okun (the chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors at the time), of a task force to review changes
in the Federal Reserve System. That message only became rein-
forced with the arrival of a new administration in 1969, given
Richard Nixon’s obsession with keeping unemployment as low as
possible. (Nixon was convinced that he had lost the 1960 presiden-
tial election to a combination of vote fraud and tight monetary
policy.)
18 A memorandum prepared at the end of December 1997 by two of
Carter’s advisers reveals the climate of the time, proposing not to
reappoint Chairman Burns for a third term because he was more
concerned with inflation than unemployment (memo for the presi-
dent on the role of the Federal Reserve, Box 16, R.K. Lipshitz Files,
Carter Library, December 10, 1977, pp. 1-2; cited by Meltzer, 2010,
p. 922).director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
or the desire, since he had little faith in restrictive
monetary policy’s ability to lower inflation.19
Thus, our estimated ʳ ʠ,t remains low during that
time.20
Burns was subject to strong pressure from
Nixon.21 His margin of maneuver was also limited
by the views among many leading economists
that overestimated the costs of disinflation and
who were in any case skeptical of monetary pol-
icy.22 But his own convictions leaned in the same
direction. According to the recollections of
Stephen H. Axilrod, a senior staff member at the
Board back then, Burns did not believe any theory
of the economy—whether Keynesian or mone-
tarist—could account for the business cycle; he
dismissed the relation between the stock of money
and the price level; and he was unwilling or
unable to make a persuasive case against inflation
to the nation and to the FOMC.23
In addition, Burns had a sympathetic attitude
toward price and wage controls. For instance, he
testified to Congress on February 7, 1973:
[T]here is a need for legislation permitting some
direct controls over wages and prices...The
structure of our economy—in particular, the
power of many corporations and trade unions
to exact rewards that exceed what could be
achieved under conditions of active competi-
tion—does expose us to upward pressure on
costs and prices that may be cumulative and
self-reinforcing (cited by Hetzel, 2008, p. 79).
He reiterated that view in a letter to the presi-
dent on June 1, 1973, in which he proposed to
reintroduce mandatory price controls for large
firms.24 In his view, controls could break the cost-
push spiral of the economy and the inflationary
pressures triggered by the social unrest of the late
1960s and be a more effective instrument than
open market operations, which could be quite
costly in terms of employment and financial dis-
turbances.25 In fact, many members of the FOMC
believed that the introduction of price and wage
controls in different phases between 1971 and
1973 had not only eased the need for monetary
tightening, but also positively suggested that mone-
tary policy should not impose further restraint
on the economy.26 More interestingly, if price and
wage controls were an argument for loose mone-
tary policy, their easing was also an argument
for expansionary policy, or as Governor Charles
Partee put it during the FOMC meeting of
January 11, 1973, the lifting of controls “might
necessitate a somewhat faster rate of monetary
19 Miller stated, “Our attempts to restrain inflation by using conven-
tional stabilization techniques have been less than satisfactory.
Three years of high unemployment and underutilized capital stock
have been costly in terms both of lost production and of the denial
to many of the dignity that comes from holding a productive job.
Yet, despite this period of substantial slack in the economy, we
still have a serious inflation problem” (Board of Governors, 1978,
p. 193; quoted by Romer and Romer, 2004, p. 140).
20 The situation with Miller reached the surrealistic point when, as
narrated by Kettl (1986), Charles Schultze, the chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, and Michael Blumenthal, the
Treasury secretary, were leaking information to the press to pressure
Miller to tighten monetary policy.
21 Perhaps the clearest documented moment is the meeting between
Nixon and Burns on October 23, 1969, right after Burns’s nomina-
tion, as narrated by John Ehrlichman (1982, pp. 248-49): “I know
there’s the myth of the autonomous Fed...Nixon barked a quick
laugh…and when you go up for confirmation some Senator may
ask you about your friendship with the President. Appearances
are going to be important, so you can call Ehrlichman to get mes-
sages to me, and he’ll call you.” The White House continued its
pressure on Burns by many different methods, from constant con-
versations to leaks to the press (falsely) accusing Burns of request-
ing a large wage increase. These, and many other histories, are
collected in a fascinating article by Abrams (2006).
22 Three examples. First, Franco Modigliani testified before the U.S.
Congress on July 20, 1971: “[Y]ou have to recognize that prices are
presently rising, and no measure we can take short of creating mas-
sive unemployment is going to make the rate of change of prices
substantially below 4 percent.” Second, Otto Eckstein, the builder
of one of the large macroeconometric models at the time, the DRI
U.S. model, argued that it was not the Fed’s job to solve structural
inflation. Third, James Tobin (1974): “For the rest of us, the torment-
ing difficulty is that the economy shows inflationary bias even
when there is significant involuntary unemployment. The bias is
in some sense a structural defect of the economy and society…
Chronic and accelerating inflation is then a symptom of a deeper
social disorder, of which involuntary unemployment is an alter-
native symptom. Political economists may differ about whether
it is better to face the social conflicts squarely or to let inflation
obscure them and muddle through. I can understand why anyone
who prefers the first alternative would be working for structural
reform, for a new social contract. I cannot understand why he
would believe that the job can be done by monetary policy. Within
limits, the Federal Reserve can shift from one symptom to the other.
But it cannot cure the disease.” The examples are quoted by Hetzel
(2008, pp. 86, 89, and 128).
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24 Burns papers, B_N1, June 1, 1973, as cited by Meltzer (2010, p. 787).
25 At the time, many financial institutions were subject to ceiling
rates on deposits, which could have made them bankrupt in the
case of a fast tightening of monetary policy.
26 Maisel’s diary entry for August 25, 1971; cited by Meltzer, 2010,
p. 790.growth to finance the desired growth in real out-
put under conditions of greater cost-push inflation
than would have prevailed with tighter controls”
(cited by Meltzer, 2010, p. 815).
Burns’s 1979 Per Jacobsson lecture is a reveal-
ing summary of Burns’s own views on the origins
and development of inflation. He blamed the
growing demands of different social groups during
the late 1960s and early 1970s and the federal
government’s willingness to concede to them as
the real culprit behind inflation. Moreover, he
felt that the Fed could not really stop the inflation-
ary wave: If the Federal Reserve then sought to
create a monetary environment that fell seriously
short of accommodating the upward pressures
on prices that were being released or reinforced
by governmental action, severe difficulties could
be quickly produced in the economy. Not only
that, the Federal Reserve would be frustrating
the will of Congress to which it was responsible.
But beyond Burns’s own defeatist attitude
toward inflation, he was a most unfortunate Chair  -
man. He was in charge during a period of high
turbulence and negative shocks, not only the 1973
oil shock, but also poor crops in the United States
and the Soviet Union. Our model estimates large
and volatile intertemporal shocks, dt, and labor
supply shocks, ˕t, during his tenure (see FGR for
a plot of these shocks). Examples of intertemporal
shocks include the final breakdown of the Bretton
Woods Agreement, fiscal policy during the 1973-
75 recession (with a temporary tax cut signed in
March 1975 and increases in discretionary spend-
ing), and Nixon’s price and wage controls (which
most likely distorted intratemporal allocations).
Examples of labor supply shocks include the his-
torically high level of strikes in American indus-
try during the early 1970s. (A major issue in the
Republican primary of 1976 between Ford and
Reagan was picketing rules for striking workers,
a policy issue most unlikely to grab many voters’
attention nowadays.)
Both types of shocks complicated monetary
policy. Large positive intertemporal shocks
increase aggregate demand. In our model, this
translates partly into higher output and partly
into higher inflation. Positive labor supply shocks
increase wages, which pushes up the marginal
cost and, therefore, inflation. Moreover, FGR show
that, if volatility had stayed at historical levels,
even with negative innovations, inflation would
have been much lower and the big peak of 1973
avoided.
However, these negative shocks should not
make us forget that, according to our model, if
monetary policy had engineered higher real
interest rates during those years, the history of
inflation could have been different. In FGR we
calculate that, had monetary policy behaved
under Burns and Miller as it did under Volcker,
inflation would have been 4.36 percent on average,
instead of the observed 6.23 percent. The experi-
ence of Germany or Switzerland, which had much
lower inflation than the United States during the
same time, suggests that this was possible. After
all, the peak of inflation in Germany was in 1971,
well before any of the oil shocks. And in neither
of these two European countries do we observe
statements such as that by Governor Sheehan on
the January 22, 1974, FOMC meeting: “[T]he
Committee had no choice but to validate the rise
in prices if it wished to avoid compounding the
recession” (Hetzel, 2008, p. 93).
Thus, our reading of monetary policy during
the Burns years through the lens of our model
emphasizes the confluence of two phenomena:
an accommodating position with respect to infla-
tion and large and volatile shocks that compli-
cated the implementation of policy. There is ample
evidence in the historical record to support this
view. This was, indeed, monetary policy in the
time of turbulence.
6.3 The Volcker Era: High Noon
In his 1979 Per Jacobsson lecture cited earlier,
Burns had concluded: “It is illusory to expect
central banks to put an end to the inflation that
now afflicts the industrial democracies.” Paul
Volcker begged to differ. He had been president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York since
August 1975 and, from that position, a vocal foe
of inflation. In particular, during his years as a
member of the FOMC, Volcker expressed concern
that the Fed was consistently underpredicting
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was more expansionary than conventionally
understood (Meltzer, 2010, p. 942).27
In the summer of 1979, Jimmy Carter moved
Miller to the Treasury Department. Then, he
offered Volcker the chairmanship of the Board of
Governors. Volcker did not hesitate to take it, but
not before warning the president “of the need
for tighter money—tighter than Bill Miller had
wanted” (Volcker and Gyothen, 1992, p. 164)
and the Senate in his confirmation hearings that
“the only sound foundation for the continuing
growth and prosperity of the American economy
is much greater price stability” (U.S. Senate, 1979,
p. 16; quoted by Romer and Romer, 2004, p. 156).
Deep changes were coming and the main decision-
makers were aware of them.
We should be careful not to attribute all of
the sharp break in monetary policy to Volcker’s
appointment. In 1975, the House passed Concur  -
rent Resolution 133, the brainchild of Karl Brunner
(Weintraub, 1977). This resolution, which asked
the Fed to report to the House Banking Committee
on objectives and plans with respect to the ranges
of growth or diminution of monetary and credit
aggregates in the upcoming twelve months, was
a first victory for monetarism. Although the reso-
lution probably did little by itself, it was a sign
that times were changing. Congress acted again
with the Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act of 1978, which required the Fed to report
monetary aggregates in its reports to Congress. In
April 1978, the federal funds rate started growing
quickly, from a monthly average of 6.9 percent to
10 percent by the end of the year. This reflected
a growing consensus on the FOMC (still with
many dissenting voices) regarding the need for
lower inflation. Figure 2 shows the start of an
increase in ʳʠ,t around that time. At the same time,
the new procedures for monetary policy that tar-
geted money growth rates and reserves instead
of the federal funds rate were not announced
until October 6, 1979. Additionally, Goodfriend
and King (2005) have argued that Volcker required
some time before asserting his control over the
FOMC. For instance, in the Board meeting of
September 18, 1979, Volcker did obtain a rise in
the discount rate, but only with three dissenting
votes. As we argued in Section 2, all of these
observations suggest that modeling the evolution
of monetary policy as a smooth change may be
more appropriate than assuming a pure break.
Regardless of the exact timing of changes in
monetary policy, the evidence in Figure 2 is over-
whelming: On or about August 1979, the character
of monetary policy changed. The federal funds
rate jumped to new levels, with the first signifi-
cant long-lasting increase in the real interest rate
in many years. Real interest rates would remain
high for the remainder of the decade of the 1980s,
partly reflecting high federal fund rates and partly
reflecting the deeply rooted expectations of infla-
tion among the agents. In any case, the response
of monetary policy to inflation, ʳ ʠ,t, was consis-
tently high during the whole of Volcker’s years.
An important question is the extent to which
the formalism of the Taylor rule can capture the
way in which monetary policy was conducted
at the time, when money growth targeting and
reserve management were explicitly tried (what
Volcker called “practical monetarism”). We are
not overly concerned about this aspect of the data
because, in our DSGE model, there is a mapping
between money targeting and the Taylor rule
(Woodford, 2003). Thus, as long as we are careful
to interpret the monetary policy shocks during the
period (which we estimate were, indeed, larger
than in other parts of the sample), our exercise
should be relatively robust to this consideration.28
A much more challenging task could be to build
a DSGE model with a richer set of monetary pol-
27 This position links to an important point made by Orphanides
(2002): Monetary policy decisions are implemented using real-
time data, a point that our model blissfully ignores. In turbulent
times such as the 1970s, this makes steering the ship of policy tar-
gets exceedingly difficult.
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28 This begets the question of why Volcker spent so much effort on
switching the operating procedure of the Fed between 1979 and
1982. Volcker himself ventures that it was easier to sell a restrictive
monetary policy in terms of money growth rates than in terms of
interest rates: “More focus on the money supply also would be a
way of telling the public that we meant business. People don’t need
an advanced course in economics to understand that inflation has
something to do with too much money” (Volcker and Gyohten,
1992, pp. 167-68).icy rules and switches between them. However,
at the moment, this goal seems infeasible.29
The impressions of participants in the mone-
tary policy process reinforced the message of
Figure 2. For instance, Axilrod (2009, p. 91) states:
During Paul Volcker’s eight-year tenure as
chairman of the Fed...policy changed dramati-
cally. He was responsible for a major transfor-
mation—akin to a paradigm shift—that was
intended to greatly reduce inflation, keep it
under control, and thereby restore the Fed’s
badly damaged reputation. Furthermore, it was
almost solely because of Volcker that this par-
ticular innovation was put in place—one of the
few instances in my opinion where a dramatic
shift in policy approach could be attributed
to a particular person’s presence rather than
mainly or just to circumstances.
Volcker himself was very explicit about his
views30:
[M]y basic philosophy is over time we have no
choice but to deal with the inflationary situa-
tions because over time inflation and unem-
ployment go together...Isn’t that the lesson of
the 1970s? We sat around [for] years thinking
we could play off a choice between one or the
other...It had some reality when everybody
thought processes were going to be stable...So
in a very fundamental sense, I don’t think we
have the choice.
In fact, Volcker’s views put him in the rather
unusual position of being outvoted on February 24,
1986. In that meeting, a majority of four members
of the Board voted against Volcker and two other
dissenting members to lower the discount rate
50 basis points.
At the same time, and according to our model,
Volcker was also an unlucky Chairman. The econ-
omy still suffered from large and negative shocks
during his tenure, since the level and volatility
of the intratemporal preference shifter did not
fall until later in his term. In FGR, we build a
counterfactual in which Volcker is faced with
the same structural shocks he faced in real life,
but with the historical average volatility. In this
counterfactual history, inflation falls to negative
values by the end of 1983, instead of still hover-
ing around 3 to 4 percent. It was a tough policy
in a difficult time. However, despite these misfor-
tunes and heavy inheritance from the past, our
model tells us that monetary policy conquered
the Great Inflation. The Great Moderation would
have to wait for better shocks.
We started this subsection with Burns’s own
words in the 1979 Per Jacobsson lecture. In 1989,
Volcker was invited to give the same lecture. What
a difference a decade can make! While Burns
was sad and pessimistic (his lecture was entitled
“The Anguish of Central Banking”), Volcker was
happy and confident (his lecture was entitled
“The Triumph of Central Banking?”). Inflation
had been defeated and he warned that “our collec-
tive experience strongly emphasizes the impor-
tance of dealing with inflation at an early stage”
(Volcker, 1990, p. 14).
6.4 The Greenspan Era: Speaking Like
a Hawk and Walking Like a Dove
These are the colorful words with which
Laurence Meyer (2004, p. 83) summarizes
Greenspan’s behavior during Meyer’s time as a
governor (June 1996 to January 2002). Once and
again,
[Greenspan] seemed to fall into a pattern: The
Chairman would ask for no change in the funds
rate, suggest that the time was approaching
for action, and indicate that there was a high
probability of a move at the next meeting. Then
at the next meeting, he would explain that the
data did not yet provide a credible basis for
tightening, and in any case, that the markets
didn’t expect a move. However, he would con-
clude that he expected the Committee would
be forced to move at the next meeting.
Meyer means these words in a positive way. In
his opinion, Greenspan discovered before he did
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29 The impact of the credit controls imposed by the Carter adminis-
tration starting on March 14, 1980, is more difficult to gauge. Inter  -
estingly, we estimate a large negative innovation to the intratemporal
preference shifter at that point in time, a likely reflection of the
distortions of the controls in the intertemporal choices of house-
holds (see the historical description in Shreft, 1990).
30 Volcker papers, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, speech at the
National Press Club, Box 97657, January 2, 1980; quoted by Meltzer,
2010, p. 1034.that the economy was being hit during the second
half of the 1990s by an unusual sequence of posi-
tive shocks and directed monetary policy to take
advantage of them.
We quote Meyer because it illustrates that
Greenspan showed from the start that he knew
how to respond to changing circumstances. He
was appointed on August 11, 1987. In his confir-
mation hearings, he clearly reaffirmed the need to
fight inflation.31 But after just a couple of months,
on October 19, 1987, he reacted to the big crash
of the stock market by declaring the Fed’s dispo-
sition to serve as a source of liquidity, even if, in
the short run, this could complicate the control
of inflation.
Later, in early 1989, the federal funds rate
started to fall, despite the fact that inflation
remained at around 6 percent until the end of
1990. As shown in Figure 2, our estimate of ʳ ʠ,t
picks up this fall by dropping itself. Moreover, it
dropped fast. We estimate that ʳʠ,t was soon below
1, back to the levels of Burns-Miller (although, for
a while, there is quite a bit of uncertainty in our
estimate). The parameter stayed there for the rest
of Greenspan’s tenure. The reason for this esti-
mated low level of ʳ ʠ,t is that the real interest rate
also started to fall rather quickly. At the same time,
a remarkable sequence of good shocks delivered
rapid output growth and low inflation.
In fact, in FGR we find that all of the shocks
went right for monetary policy during the 1990s.
A large string of positive and stable investment-
specific technological shocks delivered fast pro-
ductivity growth, a falling intertemporal shifter
lowered demand pressures, and labor supply
shocks pressured wages downward—and, with
them, marginal costs. This fantastic concatenation
of shocks accounted for the bulk of the Great
Moderation. In FGR, we calculate that without
changes in volatility, the Great Moderation would
have been much smaller. The SD of inflation
would have fallen by only 13 percent (instead of
60 percent in the data), the SD of output growth
would have fallen by 16 percent (instead of 46
percent in the data), and the SD of the federal funds
rate would have fallen by 35 percent (instead of
39 percent in the data). That is, the moderation
in inflation fluctuations would have been only
one-fifth as large as in the data (and the counter-
factual mean would have actually been higher
than in the data) and the moderation for output
growth’s SD only one-third.
We can push the argument even further. In
FGR we build the counterfactual in which the
average ʳʠ,t during the Greenspan years is plugged
into the model at the time of Burns’s appointment.
Then, we keep ʳ ʠ,t at that level and hit the model
with exactly the same shocks that we backed out
from our estimation. This exercise is logically
coherent, since we are working with a DSGE
model and, therefore, the structural and volatility
shocks are invariant to this class of interventions.
We compute that the average monetary policy
during Greenspan’s years would not have made
much of a difference in the 1970s. If anything,
inflation would have been even slightly higher
(6.83 percent in the counterfactual instead of 6.23
percent in the data). This finding contrasts with
our counterfactual in which Volcker is moved to
the Burns-Miller era. In this counterfactual, infla-
tion would have been only 4.36 percent. To sum-
marize, our reading of monetary policy during the
Greenspan years is that it was not too different
from the policy in the Burns-Miller era; it just
faced much better shocks.
Is this result credible? First, it is clear that it
is not a pure artifact of our model. A similar
result is found in Sims and Zha (2006). These
authors, using structural vector autoregressions
with Markov switching, which imposes many
fewer cross-equation restrictions than our analy-
sis, do not find much evidence of differences in
monetary policy across time (actually, Sims and
Zha’s position is even stronger than ours, since
they do find that monetary policy was different
even under Volcker). Second, there are hints in
the data that lead us to believe that the results
make sense. At the start of the 1994 inflation scare,
31 Greenspan stated in his confirmation hearings: “[W]e allowed our
system to take on inflationary biases which threw us into such a
structural imbalance that, in order to preserve the integrity of the
system, the Federal Reserve had to do what it did. Had it not acted
in the way which it did at that time, the consequences would have
been far worse than what subsequently happened” (U.S. Senate,
1987, p. 35; quoted by Romer and Romer, 2004, p. 158).
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anywhere to be seen, Greenspan argued32:
You know, I rarely feel strongly about an issue,
and I very rarely sort of press this Committee.
But let me tell you something about what’s
gnawing at me here. I am very sympathetic
with the view that we’ve got to move and that
we’re going to have an extended period of
moves, assuming the changes that are going on
now continue in the direction of strength. It is
very unlikely that the recent rate of economic
growth will not simmer down largely because
some developments involved in this particular
period are clearly one-shot factors—namely,
the very dramatic increase in residential con-
struction and the big increase in motor vehicle
sales. Essentially the two of those have added
one-shot elements to growth. In the context of
a saving rate that is not high, the probability is
in the direction of this expansion slowing from
its recent pace, which at the moment is well
over 4 percent and, adjusting for weather
effects, may be running over 5 percent. This is
not sustainable growth, and it has nothing to
do with monetary policy. In other words, it will
come down. And the way a 3 percent growth
feels, if I may put it that way, is a lot different
from the way the expansion feels now.
I would be very concerned if this Committee
went 50 basis points now because I don’t think
the markets expect it...I’ve been in the economic
forecasting business since 1948, and I’ve been
on Wall Street since 1948, and I am telling you
I have a pain in the pit of my stomach, which
in the past I’ve been very successful in alluding
to. I am telling you—and I’ve seen these mar-
kets—this is not the time to do this. I think there
will be a time; and if the staff’s forecast is right,
we can get to 150 basis points pretty easily.
We can do it with a couple of 1/2 point jumps
later when the markets are in the position to
know what we’re doing and there’s continuity.
I really request that we not do this. I do request
that we be willing to move again fairly soon,
and maybe in larger increments; that depends
on how things are evolving.
We construe this statement as revealing a low
ʳ ʠt. We could present similar evidence regarding
the behavior of policy in the aftermath of the Long
Term Capital Management fiasco or in the exit
from the 2001 recession. But we feel the point
has been made. We believe that our estimates are
right: Monetary policy in the Greenspan years
was similar to monetary policy under Burns and
Miller. Instead, time-varying structural shocks
were the mechanism that played a key role in
the Great Moderation and the low inflation of
1987-2007.
7. WHAT ARE WE MISSING?
What is our model missing that is really impor-
tant? The answer will tell us much about where
we want to go in terms of research and where we
need to be careful in our reading of monetary his-
tory. Of all the potential problems of our specifi-
cation, we are particularly concerned about the
following.
First, households and firms in the model
observe the changes in the coefficients ʳʠt and ʳ yt
when they occur. A more plausible scenario would
involve filtering in real time by the agents who
need to learn the stand of the monetary authority
from observed decisions.33 A similar argument
can be made for the values of the SDs of all the
other shocks in the economy. Unfortunately,
introducing learning suffers from two practical
difficulties: It is not obvious what is the best way
to model learning about monetary policy, espe-
cially in a nonlinear environment such as ours
where least-square rules may not work properly.
And it would make the computation of the model
nearly infeasible.
Second, we assume that monetary policy
changes are independent of the events in the
economy. However, many channels make this
assumption untenable. For instance, each admin-
istration searches for governors of the Board who
conform with its views on the economy (after all,
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32 Board of Governors FOMC Transcripts, February 3-4, 1994, p. 55.
33 The difficulties in observing monetary policy changes can be
illustrated by Axilrod’s description of a lunch with Arthur Burns
shortly after the announcement of Volcker’s new policy. According
to Axilrod (2009, p. 100), Burns stated: “You are not really going
to be doing anything different from what we were doing. If an
insider like Burns had difficulties in filtering Volcker’s behavior,
it is hard to conclude anything but that the average agents in the
economy had difficulties as well.”this is what a democracy is supposed to be about).
We saw how Heller discovered that an adminis-
tration could select governors to twist the FOMC
toward its policy priorities. This is a tradition
that has continued. Meyer (2004, p. 17) describes
the process for his own appointment as one clearly
guided by the desire of the Clinton administration
to make monetary policy more accommodative
and growth-oriented. As long as the party in power
is a function of the state of the economy, the com-
position of the FOMC will clearly be endogenous.
Similarly, changes in public perception of the
dangers of inflation certainly weighed heavily
on Carter when he appointed Volcker to lead the
Fed in 1979.
Third, and related to our two previous points,
evolving beliefs about monetary policy might be
endogenous to the developments of events and
lead to self-confirming equilibria. This is a point
emphasized by Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002)
and Sargent (2008).
Fourth, our technological drifts are constant
over time. The literature on long-run risk has high-
lighted the importance of slow-moving compo-
nents in growth trends (Bansal and Yaron, 2004).
It may be relevant to judge monetary policy to esti-
mate a model in which we have these slow-moving
components, since the productivity slowdown
of the 1970s and the productivity acceleration of
the late 1990s are bound to be reflected in our
assessment of the stance of monetary policy dur-
ing those years. This links us back to some of the
concerns expressed by Orphanides (2002). At the
same time and nearly by definition, there is very
little information in the data about this component.
Fifth, our model is a closed economy. How  -
ever, the considerations regarding exchange rates
have often played an important role in monetary
policymaking. For instance, during the late 1960s,
the United States fought an increasingly desperate
battle to keep the Bretton Woods Agreement
alive, which included the Fed administering a
program to voluntarily reduce the amount of
funds that American banks could lend abroad
(Meltzer, 2010, p. 695) and purchasing long-term
Treasury bonds to help the British pound stabilize
after its 1967 devaluation. The end of Bretton
Woods also deeply influenced policymakers in
the early 1970s. Later, Volcker’s last years at the
Fed were colored by the Plaza and Louvre Accords
and the attempts to manage the exchange rate
between the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.
Finally, our model ignores fiscal policy. The
experience of the 1960s, in which there was an
explicit attempt at coordinating fiscal and mone-
tary policies, and the changes in long-run interest
rates possibly triggered by the fiscal consolida-
tions of the 1990s indicate that the interaction
between fiscal and monetary policies deserves
much more attention, a point repeatedly made
by Chris Sims (for example in Sims, 2009).
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The title of this paper is not only a tribute to
Friedman and Schwartz’s (1971) opus magnum,
but also a statement of the limitations of our inves-
tigation. Neither the space allocated to us34 nor
our own abilities allow us to get even close to
Friedman and Schwartz’s achievements. We have
tried to demonstrate, only, that the use of modern
equilibrium theory and econometric methods
allows us to read the monetary policy history of
the United States since 1959 in ways that we find
fruitful. We proposed and estimated a DSGE model
with stochastic volatility and parameter drifting.
The model gave us a clear punch line: First, there
is ample evidence of both strong changes in the
volatility of the structural shocks that hit the econ-
omy and changes in monetary policy. The changes
in volatility accounted for most of the Great
Moderation. The changes in monetary policy
mattered for the rise and conquest of the Great
Inflation. Inflation stayed low during the next
decades in large part due to good shocks. When
we go to the historical record and use the results
of our estimation to read and assess the documen-
tary evidence, we find ample confirmation, in our
opinion, that the model, despite all its limitations,
is teaching us important lessons.
34 For an only slightly longer period than ours, Meltzer (2010) requires
1,300 pages to cover the details of the history of monetary policy
in the United States, including the evolution of operational pro-
cedures that we have not even mentioned.
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leave much unsaid. Hopefully, the results in this
paper will be enticing enough for other researchers
to continue a close exploration of recent monetary
policy history with the tools of modern dynamic
macroeconomics.
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